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Abstract
In an earlier article published in this journal I challenge Reydon and Scholz’s (2009) 
claim that Organizational Ecology is a non-Darwinian program. In this reply to 
Reydon and Scholz’s subsequent response, I clarify the difference between our 
two approaches denoted by an emphasis here on the careful application of core 
Darwinian principles and an insistence by Reydon and Scholz on direct biological 
analogies. On a substantive issue, they identify as being the principal problem for 
Organizational Ecology, namely, the inability to identify replicators and interactors 
“of the right sort” in the business domain; this is also shown to be easily addressed 
with reference to empirical studies of business populations.
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1. Introduction
Taking account of key advances in modern evolutionary theory, in my article 
titled, “Untangling the Conceptual issues in Reydon and Scholz’s Critique of 
Organizational Ecology and Darwinian Populations” (2013), I acknowledge 
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Reydon and Scholz’s central argument regarding the questionable evolution-
ary nature of populations when conceived as sets and the problems this pres-
ents for evolutionary explanation where reproductively connected communities 
are required. I go on to demonstrate how Organizational Ecology could 
develop a complete Darwinian evolutionary program by incorporating the 
replicator–interactor distinction (Hull 1988). Besides the replication of rou-
tines that occurs between organizations, this tool enables conceptualization of 
the replication and transmission of routines and capabilities over organiza-
tional generations, for example, from parent to spin-off companies. 
Accordingly, it provides conceptualization of an inheritance mechanism. 
Reydon and Scholz remain unconvinced.
Reydon and Scholz (2009) persist with the view that Organizational 
Ecology is deeply incompatible with Darwinian thinking. They belabor the 
problem regarding conceptualization of organizational populations as sets, 
and despite their professed acknowledgment of the general nature of Darwin’s 
theory (Reydon and Scholz 2009, 411), they strangely insist on direct bio-
logical analogies. With an inattentive dismissal of the replicator–interactor 
framework (which they incorrectly suggest is portrayed by me as constituting 
a Darwinian ontology), they question its relevance for the business domain 
wherein they are able to perceive neither an interactor nor generational links 
between organizations. Section 2 clarifies the key ways in which our 
approaches differ, Section 3 deals with the substantive issues around real-
world examples, and Section 4 concludes the discussion. 
2. General Principles versus Biological Analogy
The difference in our respective approaches revolves around the issue of bio-
logical analogy. This is clear in a sample of comments from Reydon and 
Scholz as follows:
In biology, the term “evolution” has a very specific meaning (e.g., Futuyma 2005, 
2ff.) and talk of “evolution” in Organizational Ecology, we argue, does not involve 
this precise meaning. (2009, 411)
Organizational Ecologists cannot say to have identified entities that actually 
evolve, at least not in any way that even faintly resembles biological evolutionary 
processes. (forthcoming, 3)
[T]he organizational “populations” studied in Organizational Ecology are 
insufficiently like the organismal populations studied in evolutionary biology to 
act as entities in evolutionary processes. (forthcoming, 4)
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Following proponents of generalized Darwinism (Aldrich et al. 2008; 
Hodgson and Knudsen 2010), the approach here is emphatically not to seek 
direct biological analogies with phenomena in the social domain but instead 
to carefully apply the core explanatory principles of Darwinism to complex 
population systems that meet certain criteria. Note that this signifies a very 
different starting point and approach to that concerned with biological anal-
ogy, and it is important to distinguish between the two positions.
Analogies are used to illuminate and explain phenomena and processes in 
a one domain (target) on the basis of their similarity to phenomena and pro-
cesses in another domain (base). If they are insufficiently similar, they are 
considered disanalogous. Reydon and Scholz see Organizational Ecology 
(target) and biological evolution (base) as disanalogous because, among 
other things, the entities and mechanisms of replication are very different. 
Proponents of generalized Darwinism also recognize these disanalogies, but 
it is argued that these differences at the level of detail do not undermine this 
approach because essentially analogical claims are different from generaliza-
tions (Hodgson and Knudsen 2010, 23).
Before he formalized the replicator–interactor framework, in an earlier 
paper where he explains his approach to the “units of selection” problem in 
biology, the philosopher David Hull (1981) illustrated what we mean by 
“generalization” in science. Reflecting on the approach adopted by geneti-
cist Richard Lewontin (1970), he observed how the latter first characterizes 
the evolutionary process and then considers evidence for and against selec-
tion at various levels of organization. Hull then explained his own approach, 
which, by contrast, begins by focusing on the evolutionary process itself, 
investigating its general characteristics, and only then considering which 
entities have the requisite characteristics to function in the evolutionary 
process.1
Whereas analogy is about mapping knowledge from one domain to 
another, generalization resists any analytical bias and begins by observing 
complex mixes of different entities, processes, and systems of relations and 
striving to identify essential features held in common. In this way, scientists 
draw out general principles unconstrained by the detailed mechanisms of any 
one domain and then formulate these at fairly high levels of abstraction.
1 Hull (2001, 21) “One reason why evolutionary biologists have been unable to 
discover universal regularities in the evolutionary process is that they are not 
comparing like with like. They are dividing up the organizational hierarchy inap-
propriately. The appropriate levels are not genes, organisms, and species as they 
are traditionally conceived, but replicators, interactors, and lineages.”
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In generalized Darwinism, the principles of variation, inheritance, and 
selection provide a meta-theoretical framework within which auxiliary theo-
ries, pertinent to phenomena in the domain of enquiry, supplement the analy-
sis. As previously observed (forthcoming, 21), what defines this approach, as 
its authors stress, is “the claim of common abstract features in both the social 
and the biological world” and “a contention of a degree of ontological com-
munality, at a high level of abstraction and not at the level of detail” (Hodgson 
and Knudsen 2010, 22).2
While Reydon and Scholz are correct to caution against an “evolutionary 
everything” mentality (forthcoming 6), they are decidedly incorrect to sug-
gest that this characterizes the approach of generalized Darwinism, the archi-
tects of which have been consistently clear about required conditions and 
spheres of application (Hodgson and Knudsen 2008, 2010, 2012). Slavish 
adherence to biological analogy for elements of this generalized conceptual 
structure is simply not necessary nor is it helpful.
Correspondingly, it is important to stress here that the population-defining 
problem of central concern to Reydon and Scholz (regarding reproductive 
relatedness within populations), which was comprehensively addressed in 
my earlier paper via the replicator–interactor tool, remains a problem in biol-
ogy too. Referred to as “the species problem” (de Queiroz 2005), it recog-
nizes that contrary to the widely held view that defines populations as an 
interbreeding group reproductively isolated from other groups, reproduction 
occurs in a number of different ways in the natural world (i.e., sexual, asex-
ual, parthenogenesis). Insufficient information around sexual dimorphism, 
polymorphism and other types of variation, as well as around “evolutionary 
intermediacy” (when populations are diverging to form new species) con-
tinue to complicate the issue so that species are not clearly delineated in evo-
lutionary biology either. However, this has not stalled evolutionary theorizing 
in biology.
Indeed, it should be noted that because of the very different biological 
mechanisms of replication, generalization is required within biology as well. 
As Hull points out below (1988, 403):
2Hodgson and Knudsen (2012, 609) elsewhere offer further clarification on this posi-
tion, “In making the claim . . . that social evolution is Darwinian, we are interested 
in establishing principles and concepts of sufficient but not maximal generality. The 
principles and concepts must be sufficiently general to span the key common features 
of biological and social evolution, but they need not encompass any conceivable defi-
nition of evolutionary processes (and implied phenomena) in these domains.”
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As it turns out, the amount of increased generality needed to accommodate the full 
range of biological phenomena turns out to be extensive enough to include social 
and conceptual evolution as well.
3. The Right Sort of Replicators and Interactors
Unshackled by the misguided call for direct biological analogies and 
acknowledging that organizational ecologists must similarly negotiate fuzzy 
boundaries between industrial forms,3 this leads to the second challenge 
posed by Reydon and Scholz. That is, evidence that the business domain 
encompasses replicators and interactors “of the right sort” (forthcoming, 5).
While we agree that routines might be seen as replicators, we believe that it is not 
with the replicators that the problem lies—it is with the interactors . . . the problem 
is that successful organizations (interactors) do not give rise to offspring 
organizations that closely resemble their “parents”—that is, that organizations do 
not “breed true” and, indeed, do not breed at all. There is no reason to think that 
routines are transmitted preferably to organizations of the same kind or set. 
(forthcoming, 7)
As they rightly point out, my earlier work did not elaborate on examples. 
Focused on a defense of Darwinian thinking for the social sciences and elu-
cidation of the theoretical framework required for remedying Organizational 
Ecology (which included rejection of the definition of organizational popula-
tions as “sets”), this was a very conceptually orientated paper. The fact is that 
the business domain is replete with paradigmatic replicators and interactors 
in the form of routines and business organizations. Moreover, there is ample 
evidence of strong generational links between organizations and within 
populations.
Spin-off enterprises offer clear examples of firms giving rise to offspring 
firms that closely resemble their parents. Spin-offs can be created by existing 
firms creating new firms from one of its divisions or from breakaway groups 
starting up new businesses. Noted as prevalent new entrants in many high-
tech industries, recent research on spin-offs in the hard disk drive industry 
highlights the importance of inherited know-how from the parent firm and 
3Although these forms must adhere to the requirement for “structural cohesion” of the 
interactor. Hull (1988, 408) defines the interactor as, “an entity that directly interacts 
as a cohesive whole with its environment in such a way that this interaction causes 
replication to be differential.”
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the impact of the level and quality of this on firm formulation and survival 
(Franco and Filson 2006).
Indeed, studies show that spin-offs are quite common in some industries 
with people leaving organizations equipped with routines they replicate to 
create new organizations of the same kind (Christensen 1993; Klepper 2001; 
Klepper and Sleeper 2005; Phillips 2002). It has also been demonstrated that 
people who create organizations in populations where they have had previous 
work experience do better than those from outside the industry with entrepre-
neurs replicating industry routines and capabilities in their start-up firms 
(Agarwal et al. 2004; Dahl and Sorenson 2013).
Franchises offer another example of firms giving rise to new firms that 
resemble the parent. First observed in motor vehicle dealerships and service 
station franchises, and now very common in the catering industry and typi-
fied by leading brands like McDonalds and Subway, franchised firms are 
characterized by the franchisees’ strict adherence to the proven business for-
mula. Studies show how the “copy exactly” practice contributes to the suc-
cess and growth of the franchising network (Szulanski and Jensen 2008).
Finally, mergers and acquisitions can be seen as a form of “mating” and 
variety creation and another way in which routines are passed from one gen-
eration to another.4
By these various means, through successive rounds of selection acting 
upon the interacting business firms, proven problem-solving cognitive and 
behavioral routines are transmitted to the next generation of firms.
4. Conclusion
The view here is that with an insistence on direct biological analogies, Reydon 
and Scholz are applying a test that is really not appropriate. The real issue for 
social scientists in general and organizational ecologists in particular is 
whether Darwinian thinking can usefully advance understanding of organiza-
tional evolution. This has been convincingly demonstrated by multiple schol-
ars across the natural and social sciences only a few of whom have been cited 
here. Together with empirical studies of organizational populations, the theo-
retical framework and conceptual apparatus discussed above reveal the integ-
rity of business organizations as interactors and units of analysis in a Darwinian 
explanation. Integration of the replicator–interactor distinction into the current 
model will not only render Organizational Ecology a more complete Darwinian 
4See the evolutionary account of Aldrich and Reuf (2006) for elaboration on some of 
the aforementioned studies and many other studies of organizational transformation.
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program, but it will also offer researchers important insights about knowledge 
transmission within and among firms as well as the nature of the relationship 
of these firm-level activities to industry dynamics.
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